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Abstract
We consider a SIRS model with time dependent transmission rate.
We assume time dependent vaccination which confers the same immu-
nity as natural infection. We study two types of vaccination strate-
gies: i) optimal vaccination, in the sense that it minimizes the effort
of vaccination in the set of vaccination strategies for which, for any
sufficiently small perturbation of the disease free state, the number of
infectious individuals is monotonically decreasing; ii) Nash-equilibria
strategies where all individuals simultaneously minimize the joint risk
of vaccination versus the risk of the disease. The former case corre-
sponds to an optimal solution for mandatory vaccinations, while the
second corresponds to the equilibrium to be expected if vaccination
is fully voluntary. We are able to show the existence of both optimal
and Nash strategies in a general setting. In general, these strategies
will not be functions but Radon measures. For specific forms of the
transmission rate, we provide explicit formulas for the optimal and
the Nash vaccination strategies.
Keywords: Epidemiological models; Vaccination strategies; Game the-
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1 Introduction
Vaccination is the best response available in the control of most infectious
diseases. A huge effort is put on the development of new and better vaccines.
When humans are directly involved, the role of direct experimentation is nat-
urally limited and therefore mathematical models have been used to evaluate
the effect of control measures, such as vaccination, to assist in policy deci-
sions. One central result of classical mathematical models for the spread of
infectious diseases is that persistence of an infectious disease within a pop-
ulation requires the density of susceptible individuals to exceed a strictly
positive critical value such that, on average, each primary case of infection
generates more than one secondary case. It is therefore not necessary to
vaccinate everyone within a community to eliminate infection. This phe-
nomenon is known as herd immunity and is one of the key epidemiological
questions in defining a vaccination strategy.
In this work, we consider a SIRS model with periodic transmission. The
model consists of a non-autonomous system of ordinary differential equations
in which we introduce periodic vaccination of adults. For simplicity, we
considered that vaccination confers the same protection as natural infection.
We study the consequences of two extreme types of vaccination strategies:
mandatory vaccination, where the population is vaccinated at a predefined
rate; and voluntary vaccination, where individuals can choose freely to be
vaccinated or not, according to their risk perception.
Mathematical models have been widely used to help health authorities
in the definition of vaccination strategies for very different contexts. Typi-
cally, the objective is to define an optimal vaccination strategy by minimizing
combinations of the vaccination effort/cost and of the effective reproduction
number R0 (i.e., the number of secondary infections generated by a primary
case) (Mu¨ller and Hadeler, 1996; Castillo-Chavez and Feng, 1998; Laguzet
and Turinici, 2015a). This can give rise to particularly interesting problems
when we consider non-homogeneous models for which vaccination strategy
depends on age (Mu¨ller and Hadeler, 1996; Castillo-Chavez and Feng, 1998;
Tartof et al., 2013), risk-groups (Scott et al., 2015; Long and Owens, 2011)
or when it is time-dependent (Onyango and Mu¨ller, 2014; d’Onofrio, 2002;
Browne et al., 2015; Houy, 2016). The current work is concerned with time-
dependent epidemic models with vaccination when both the transmission
rate and the vaccination are assumed to be periodic. Note that periodic
vaccinations are used by public health services; e.g., influenza vaccine is only
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available in a specific season of the year.
Whenever the goal is long term disease elimination, optimal vaccination
will consist on reducing R0 below one, in the sense that it implies the at-
tractiveness and the asymptotic stability of the disease-free state. Here, we
choose to work with an alternative definition of optimal vaccination, where
the goal is, not only to eliminate disease but also to prevent outbreaks.
Hence, we define a class of preventive vaccination profiles such that, for any
sufficiently small perturbation of the disease free state, the number of in-
fectious individuals is monotonically decreasing. We construct the optimal
vaccination strategy as the limit of preventive strategies for which vaccination
effort is minimized. We start by revisiting basic concepts in mathematical
epidemiology to recall that for constant transmission, the condition R0 ≤ 1,
and subsequent stability of the disease-free state, is equivalent to the condi-
tion that infectious population I is monotonically decreasing in time, when
the initial number of susceptible individuals is below the number of suscep-
tible individuals in the disease free state. However, as we move towards
more general situations this equivalence may not hold. Note that the for-
mer condition refers to the long term behaviour of the system, while the
latter considers also the short time behaviour which, in principle, is more re-
strictive (Hastings, 2010, 2004). In particular, the former condition restricts
the average transmission over a period and the latter is defined pointwise in
time. Our approach is particularly suitable for diseases with high mortality
or morbidity rates, for which it is imperative to prevent outbreaks. Despite
that, so far our model and examples will not consider disease related death.
On the opposite end of vaccination policies is voluntary vaccination, which
is increasingly common in industrialized countries. Even when vaccines are
offered by the public health system without costs, vaccination is, at least in
part, voluntary. Opposition to vaccines can be philosophical, religious and
depend on social contacts and information available. It puts important chal-
lenges to disease control by decreasing vaccine uptake. The case which is best
known is the measles, since the unproven hypotheses that measles-mumps-
rubella (MMR) vaccine was linked to autism led to a decrease in vaccination
followed by measles epidemics in UK (Fitzpatrick, 2004; Jansen et al., 2003).
Voluntary vaccination can also give rise to free-rider phenomenon, where in-
dividuals or families choose not to be vaccinated, or to not have their children
vaccinated, taking advantage of herd immunity created in the population by
others, avoiding the possible negative effects of vaccination. In this work,
we consider a population of rational individuals that compares the risk of
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the vaccination (more precisely, its perception of the risk of the vaccination)
and the risk of the disease and make options that minimizes the joint risk.
Despite the fact that some countries are implementing fines for parents that
prefer not to vaccinate their children1, we do not introduce in the model a
risk of non-vaccination, other than the one associated to the disease.
In this work, we model human behaviour using game theory. In a seminal
paper by Bauch and Earn (2004), it has been shown that voluntary vaccina-
tion cannot lead to disease eradication. The authors coupled a SIR model
for disease spread in a partially vaccinated population with a theoretical
game framework describing a population of rational individuals. Many sub-
sequent developments were made in order to include the human behaviour in
epidemiological models (cf. Chen (2006); d’Onofrio et al. (2007); Manfredi
et al. (2009); Coelho and Codec¸o (2009); Mbah et al. (2012); Manfredi and
D’Onofrio (2013); Morin et al. (2013); Bhattacharyya et al. (2015); Laguzet
and Turinici (2015b)). See also (Funk et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2015) for a
review, and (Funk et al., 2015) for further discussion on the subject.
In this paper, we generalize the framework of Bauch and Earn (2004) to
the SIRS model with periodic transmission function. From the modelling
point of view, we consider that all choices in the population influence the
dynamics, and the resulting dynamics also has effect in the rational behaviour
of the population. Due to the richness of the non-autonomous system that
describes our model, several technical problems arise. For instance, the risk
of disease no longer depends simply on the constant steady state as before.
Considering a rational individual, we assume that he/she is going to choose
to be vaccinated only when the risk of disease times the probability of being
infected is higher than the risk of the vaccine, as perceived by the taker.
As we analyse only stationary states of our periodic system, the risk to
be minimized is the joint risk of vaccination and disease during one season.
Hence, we define the set of herd immunity provider vaccination strategies, for
which the rational strategy for a given focal (rational) individual is not to be
vaccinated, taking advantage of the herd immunity provided by the choices of
the rest of the population. Moreover, we define a Nash vaccination strategy
as the strategy that minimizes the joint risk for every individual taking into
account the strategy of all other individuals, i.e., the natural strategy to be
1That’s the case of Poland and Australia. See http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/204007,
Parents-fined-for-not-vaccinating-children and http://naturalsociety.com/australia-
enforces-15k-penalty-for-parents-who-dont-vaccinate/, respectively.
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expected in a population of rational individuals with full knowledge of all
epidemiological data.
Existence of optimal and Nash vaccination strategies are proved in this
work in a very general setting; however, these strategies may not be functions
but Radon measures, even for transmission rates given by a real function.
This is a consequence of the fact that the set of continuous functions in a
given compact interval is not closed under any reasonable metric. Many
results used in the existence proofs presented in the appendices require com-
pactness and after introducing a convenient topology in the set of continuous
functions, we are naturally led to the introduction, in this framework, of
Radon measures. For more information on the topic of Radon measures we
refer to (Schwartz, 1973; Athreya and Lahiri, 2006).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the math-
ematical model and derive some preliminary results. Section 3 is dedicated
to the vaccination strategies. First, we give rigorous definitions of preventive
vaccination strategies, and of vaccination effort and we define the optimal
strategy as one strategy that can be arbitrarily approximated by a preven-
tive strategy and such that its associated effort is never superior to the effort
of any given preventive strategy. In the context of voluntary vaccination, we
define the set of herd immunity provider strategies and the concept of Nash
strategy, in which all individuals minimizes the joint risk of vaccination and
disease. In the end of the Subsection 3.2, we state the main theorem, which
guarantees the existence of an optimal and a Nash vaccination strategies in
the set of Radon measures. Explicit formulas for the optimal and Nash strate-
gies are provided in Subsection 3.3, for specific forms of the transmission rate.
In Section 4, we present some examples such as the constant transmission
case, the sinusoidal case and also a critical case to illustrate the results from
previous sections. We finish with two appendices, the first one guaranteeing
the existence of periodic solutions in the model and the second proving the
existence of optimal and Nash strategies.
2 The Model
Consider a SIRS model. Let S(t), I(t), R(t) be the fraction of susceptible,
infectious and recovered individuals at time t ≥ 0. We assume non negative
normalized initial conditions, i.e, S(0), I(0), R(0) ≥ 0, S(0)+I(0)+R(0) = 1.
We also assume the transitions S + I
β−→ 2I, I γ−→ R, R α−→ S, S p−→ R.
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Figure 1: Schematic diagram of the SIRS model with death and vaccinations.
Constants µ (mortality/birth rate), α (temporary immunity) and γ (recovery
rate) are strictly positive. The disease is assumed to be non-fatal, i.e., the
death rate µ > 0 does not depend on the disease class. By normalization,
we also consider the birth rate as µ. These are common assumptions of
compartmental epidemiological models.
We consider functions β, p : R+ → R+, representing the transmission and
vaccination rates at time t, respectively. More precise assumptions on these
functions will be introduced latter on.
From now on, we call SIRS model to the following system of differential
equations:
S ′ = µ+ αR− β(t)IS − p(t)S − µS
= µ+ α− αI − β(t)IS − p(t)S − (µ+ α)S (1a)
I ′ = β(t)IS − γI − µI (1b)
R′ = γI + p(t)S − µR− αR (1c)
A schematic representation of the SIRS model with vaccination is represented
in Figure 1. Due to the normalization S(t)+I(t)+R(t) = S(0)+I(0)+R(0) =
1, the equation for R is always redundant and will be ignored from now on.
We define ∆2 := {(x, y) ∈ R2|x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, x+ y ≤ 1}.
We begin by analysing the solutions and stability of system (1).
Lemma 1. Let us consider that functions β and p are continuous functions
with commensurable periods, i.e., there exists T > 0 such that p(t+T ) = p(t)
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and β(t + T ) = β(t) for all t. Equivalently, we assume that β, p ∈ C([0, T ])
with (p(0), β(0)) = (p(T ), β(T )).
Therefore, there exists only one periodic solution of system (1) in the
subspace {I(t) = 0, ∀t}, given by (S0(t), 0) ∈ ∆2. We call this solution the
disease-free solution. This solution attracts all initial conditions of the form
(S(0), 0). We define I0(t) = 0.
Depending on the choices of the parameters γ, µ and the functions p, β,
we may have one of two possibilities:
1. The disease-free solution is globally stable in ∆2;
2. There are other periodic solutions (with period multiple of T ), called
endemic solutions (Si(t), Ii(t)) ∈ ∆2, with Ii(t) > 0, for all t ∈ R+ and
i ∈ N. In this case, there is η > 0 such that for any initial condition
(S(0), I(0)) with I(0) > 0, we have lim inft→∞ I(t) > η. In this case,
we say that the solution of the SIRS model is persistent.
Furthermore, for any initial condition, the solution (S(t), I(t)) depends con-
tinuously on β and p; namely, if pn → p and βn → β weakly as measures
and both sequences are uniformly integrable, then Si[pn, βm] → Si[p, β] and
Ii[pn, βm]→ Ii[p, β] uniformly in [0, T ], when n,m→∞, i ∈ N.
Proof. For the first part, see Rebelo et al. (2012); see Appendix A for further
details. The second part follows from Heunis (1984, theorem 2.1).
Remark 1. The assumptions on β, p in the previous lemma are extremely
restrictive and used only for the first part of the result (existence of dis-
ease free solution and periodicity of the endemic solution). If we relax our
assumptions to require only that β is of bounded variation and p is a mea-
surable function, then existence of solutions (not necessarily periodic) and
convergence of solutions (as in the second part of Lemma 1) is guaranteed
by (Heunis, 1984). This will be explored in the examples. Note that if βn, pn
are continuous then, β := lim βn and p := lim pn necessarily satisfy these
more relaxed assumptions.
For constant transmission and vaccination, we establish the following re-
sult, that is going to motivate our definition of optimal vaccination.
Lemma 2. Consider that β(t) = β0 > 0 and p(t) = p0 ≥ 0. The only sta-
tionary disease free solution of system (1) is given by Sˆ0 = Sˆ0[p] = S0[p](t) =
µ+α
p0+µ+α
≤ 1. Furthermore, the three conditions below are equivalent:
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1. β0Sˆ0
γ+µ
≤ 1.
2. The disease free solution (Sˆ0, 0) is globally asymptotically stable.
3. I ′ < 0 for all I > 0 and all S < Sˆ0.
Proof. 1⇔3. Note that I ′ = I(γ + µ)
(
β0S
γ+µ
− 1
)
, and therefore, assuming
I > 0, I ′ < 0 if and only if S < γ+µ
β0
.
1⇒3. S < Sˆ0 ≤ γ+µβ0 and then I ′ < 0.
3⇒1. I ′ < 0 if and only if S < γ+µ
β0
and therefore Sˆ0 ≤ γ+µβ0 .
1⇔2.
1⇒2. We follow ideas from (Cruz, 2009); see also (Capasso, 1993) for
other examples of use of Lyapunov functions in Mathematical Epidemiology.
Let us define
V (S, I) =
1
2
(
S − Sˆ0 + I
)2
+ aI, a =
2(µ+ α) + γ + p0
β0
.
We differentiate V with respect to t and obtain
V ′(S, I) =
dV
dt
=
(
S − Sˆ0 + I
)
(S ′ + I ′) + aI ′
=
(
S − Sˆ0 + I
)
((Sˆ0 − S)(p0 + µ+ α)− (γ + α + µ)I) + aI ′
=−
(
S − Sˆ0
)2
(p0 + µ+ α)− I2(γ + α + µ)
− (S − Sˆ0)I(2(µ+ α) + γ + p0) + a(β0IS − (γ + µ))I.
=−
(
S − Sˆ0
)2
(p0 + µ+ α)− I2(γ + α + µ)
− aβ0I
(
γ + µ
β0
− Sˆ0
)
.
Let G = {(S, I) ∈ [0, 1] × (0, 1]|S + I ≤ 1}. Note that V ′ is a continuous
function in G and, by Condition 1, it is negative. It is immediate to verify
that V is a Lyapunov function in G. Let G¯ be the closure of G. As {(S, I) ∈
G¯|V ′(S, I) = 0} is the singleton with the equilibrium point {(Sˆ0, 0)} we
conclude from Hale (2009, Corollary 1.2 in Chapter X) that (Sˆ0, 0) is globally
asymptotically stable.
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2⇒1. After system linearisation around the disease free solution
(Sˆ0, 0), we find the Jacobian matrix(−p0 − µ− α −α− β0Sˆ0
0 (γ + µ)
(
β0Sˆ0
γ+µ
− 1
)) .
If β0Sˆ0
γ+µ
> 1, the equilibrium would not be stable, which leads to a contradic-
tion.
From the above lemma, we recover the effective reproductive number for
the constant parameter case, R0 := R0[p] := β0Sˆ0[p]γ+µ . Condition R0 ≤ 1
guarantees at the same time that all epidemics will be eventually extinct and
that I(t) decreases monotonically in time, from I(0) > 0.
However, in the time dependent case (in particular in the periodic case),
these two phenomena are not equivalent. In general, even for linear systems,
it is possible that before being attracted to an asymptotic equilibrium, the
trajectory of (S(t), I(t)) drifts away from this equilibrium (Hastings, 2010,
2004).
For the periodic case, we can compute the effective reproduction number,
following (Thieme, 2000) (see also (Wang and Zhao, 2008)), as
R0 := 1
γ + µ
〈βS0〉 = 1
T (γ + µ)
∫ T
0
β(t)S0(t)dt . (2)
Note that, for the periodic case, condition R0 < 1 still guarantees asymp-
totic stability of the disease free case (Wang and Zhao, 2008), but does not
necessarily prevent the existence of outbreaks; see, e.g., (Zhao, 2008).
In this work, we will look for conditions that generalize, for time-dependent
parameters, Condition 3 in Lemma 2, i.e., that guarantees that the number of
infectious is monotonically decreasing for small perturbations of the disease
free solution. From the modelling point of view, no particular definition can
be considered better than the other; in fact, for certain particular diseases
(e.g., polio, tuberculosis) vaccination policy aims to eradicate/eliminate the
disease in the long run, while for other diseases, governments act to prevent
the existence of large outbreaks (e.g., influenza, cholera) (WHO, 2015). Our
approach describes better this second setting.
9
From now on, we assume that, for a given vaccination strategy p(t), sys-
tem (S(t), I(t)) is in its stationary (periodic) state, and we will consider two
different cases:
(C1) The disease free state (S0[p](t), 0);
(C2) A certain endemic state (S1[p](t), I1[p](t)). (There is no uniqueness
for the endemic state; for the sake of simplicity, we will consider from
now on only one endemic solution. There is no essential change if we
consider more than one.)
Both solutions are assumed to be periodic, possibly with period multiple of
T ; however, without loss of generality, we will consider the period given by
T . Note that for a different set of parameters more complicated behaviour
(possible chaotic) can be found, cf. (Kuznetsov and Piccardi, 1994).
3 Vaccination strategies
In this section we will consider two types of vaccination: mandatory and
voluntary vaccination. For each one, we will define one special case: for the
former, an optimal vaccination is defined as one vaccination strategy that is
able to prevent outbreaks while having the minimum number of vaccinations
possible and for the latter, a Nash vaccination strategy is defined as a strategy
in which all individuals in population minimize the joint risk of both disease
and vaccine.
3.1 Optimal vaccination
For the optimal vaccination, we choose to work with a generalization of
Condition 3 in Lemma 2. More specifically, we say that a certain vaccination
strategy p is a preventive strategy when the fraction of individuals in the
class I decreases monotonically in time for any small enough perturbation of
the disease free state. We then construct the optimal vaccination strategy
as the limit of the preventive strategies for which the vaccination effort is
minimized. In (Onyango and Mu¨ller, 2014), optimality for time dependent
vaccination profiles is defined based on the effective reproductive number.
Note that in our model, only susceptibles are vaccinated, which implies a full
knowledge of the current status of an individual.
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Definition 1. We define the vaccination effort associated to a given strategy
p, as the average number of vaccinations in one period, i.e. E[p] := 〈pS[p]〉 :=
1
T
∫ T
0
p(t)S[p](t)dt, where 〈·〉 denotes the average in one period, and S is the
relevant solution, given by (C1) or (C2), defined above.
We denote a cumulative distribution function, associated with p, by
P(t) =
∫ t
0
dp, or in a more relaxed notation dP(t) = p(t)dt. To simplify
the notation, we will use indistinctly dP and pdt, whenever there is no risk
of confusion. Therefore, we now write E[p] = 1
T
∫ T
0
S(τ)dP(τ). For technical
reasons, we need to consider bounds in the set of vaccination profiles. More
precisely:
Definition 2. We say that a certain vaccination function p is admissible if
its cumulative distribution is such that
P([0, T ]) =
∫ T
0
dP ≤ (µ+ α )T β¯
γ + µ
, (3)
where β¯ = supt∈[0,T ] β(t). Furthermore, we use RM+ to denote the set of non-
negative Radon measures P in [0, T ] such that P([0, T ]) ≤ (µ+ α )T β¯
γ+µ
and
C+([0, T ]) to denote the set of continuous functions in [0, T ], with p(0) = p(T )
such that
∫ T
0
p(t)dt ≤ (µ+α)T β¯
γ+α
. We also consider the natural immersion
C+([0, T ]) ⊂ RM+.
Now we show that the definition of vaccination effort can be extend con-
tinuously for the case of Radon measures.
Lemma 3. Let pn ∈ C+([0, T ]) be such that pn → p ∈ RM+, in the weak
topology, cf. (Koralov and Sinai, 2007), and let E[p] := limE[pn]. Then, E[p]
is independent of the choice of the sequence pn.
Proof. Let pn, qn ∈ C+([0, T ]) such that pn, qn → p ∈ RM+. Let Pn and Qn
be the associated cumulative distribution functions, respectively. Note that
E[pn]− E[qn] =
∫ T
0
(S[pn]dPn − S[qn]dQn)
=
∫ T
0
S[pn]d (Pn − Qn) +
∫ T
0
(S[pn]− S[qn]) dQn .
From the fact that S[pn] is bounded and Pn − Qn → 0, we conclude that
the first integral converges to 0. For the second integral, the convergence
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to 0 follows from the continuity of p 7→ S[p] in the appropriate topology.
See (Heunis, 1984, theorem 2.1) for further details.
Definition 3. Let β ∈ C([0, T ]), β(0) = β(T ) be given. For a given vacci-
nation strategy p, let (S0(t), 0) = (S0[p](t), 0) be the disease-free solution of
System (1). We say that p is a preventive strategy if β(t)S0[p](t) < γ + µ
for all t. We call χp = χp[β] the set of admissible strategies that are preven-
tive, i.e, χp = {p ∈ C+([0, T ]), with p(0) = p(T ), and β(t)S0[p](t) < γ + µ,
for all t ∈ [0, T ]}.
Now, we analyse the preventive strategies. First, we explicitly charac-
terize the disease free state and then we show the existence of at least one
preventive strategy. Afterwards, we define the concept of optimal strategy.
Here, we reproduce the result from (Thieme, 2003, Theorem 3.7).
Lemma 4. Let S0[p](t) be the time dependent periodic number of susceptibles
in the unique disease free state of system (1). Then
S0[p](0) =
(µ+ α)
∫ T
0
e−
∫ T
s (p+µ+α)(τ)dτds
1− e−
∫ T
0 (p+µ+α)(τ)dτ
.
Before looking for optimal strategies, we prove that the set of preventive
strategies is not empty.
Lemma 5. For any choice of parameters, there exists at least one preventive
strategy, i.e., χp[β] 6= ∅ for all β ∈ C([0, T ]), β(0) = β(T ).
Proof. Given β, assume p(t) = p0 > (µ + α)
(
β¯
γ+µ
− 1
)
, constant, corre-
sponding to a preventive strategy in the case of the maximum transmission
rate. Note that S0[p](t) =
µ+α
p0+µ+α
is the only stationary solution of the Equa-
tion (1a) with I(t) = 0 and is, additionally, the solution obtained from the
initial condition given by Lemma 4. From the definition of p0, we conclude
that β(t)S0[p](t) < γ + µ for all t, and then {p(t) = p0} ∈ χp.
Finally, we construct the optimal vaccination strategy as one strategy that
can be arbitrarily approximated by a preventive strategy and such that its
associated effort is never superior to the effort of any preventive strategy.
More rigorously, we define an optimal vaccination strategy by
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Definition 4. Let β ∈ C([0, T ]), β(0) = β(T ) be given. We say that a given
strategy popt = popt[β] is optimal if the following conditions are simultaneously
satisfied:
1. there is at least one sequence χp[β] 3 pn → popt (in measure).
2. for any p ∈ χp[β], E[p] ≥ E[popt].
Whenever popt is a function (as discussed in Subsection 3.3), Definition 4
means simply that there is a sequence of preventive strategies that converge
to popt and that popt minimizes the vaccination effort in the closure of the set
χp.
3.2 Rational vaccination
In this subsection, we study a population of rational individuals and how
their decisions influence the disease dynamics.
For each focal individual the probability of getting the disease is assumed
to depend on the disease incidence for each time step. The following lemma
shows how this probability can be computed from the model.
Lemma 6. The probability that a susceptible non-vaccinated individual at
time t gets the disease between times t and t+ ∆t, for ∆t sufficiently small,
is given by β(t)I(t)∆t+ o (∆t).
Proof. All susceptible non-vaccinated individuals are in the category S. From
time t to time t + ∆t, β(t)I(t)S(t)∆t individuals will be infected, µS(t)∆t
will die and the remainder S(t)−[µS(t) + β(t)I(t)S(t)] ∆t will be in the class
S at time t + ∆t. Therefore, the probability to be infected from times t to
t+ ∆t, given that he/she did not die, is given by
β(t)I(t)S(t)∆t
S(t)− [µS(t) + β(t)I(t)S(t)] ∆t+ β(t)I(t)S(t)∆t = β(t)I(t)∆t+ o (∆t) ,
where we used (1− µ∆(t))−1 = 1 + o (∆t).
See Figure 2, for a schematic representation of this reasoning.
For the voluntary vaccination, we consider that a rational individual will
(not) vaccinate him/herself if the risk of the disease times the probability to
get the disease, given the overall strategy of the population, is larger than
13
S(t)
S(t + ∆t)
I(t + ∆t)
β(t)I(t)S(t)∆t
S(t)− [µ+ β
(t)I(t)]
S(t)∆t
µS(t)∆t
Figure 2: Transitions of non-vaccinated individuals from state S at time t
out by death (down arrow) and to states S and I at time t + ∆t. Note that
indications in the arrows are for the total number of individuals leaving state
S during interval ∆t.
(respectively, small than) the risk of the vaccine. If both risks are the same,
any strategy is equally advantageous. A fully informed rational individual
will access, in the beginning of the season, the probability to get the disease,
using all available epidemiological data, and decides his/her personal strategy
as the strategy that minimizes the joint risk, i.e., the risk of the disease times
the probability to get it (conditional to no vaccination), plus the risk of the
vaccine (conditional to vaccination), during the next season.
We start by defining the set of immunity provider strategies, i.e., the
set of strategies for which a focal rational individual will decide to be not
vaccinated.
Definition 5. Let β ∈ C([0, T ]), β(0) = β(T ) be given. For a given vaccina-
tion strategy p, assume the existence of a persistent endemic solution (S1, I1).
Let rd > 0 and rv > 0 be the risks of the disease and of the vaccination, re-
spectively. We define r := rv
rd
. We say that p is a herd immunity provider
strategy if β(t)I1[p](t) < r for all t. We call χh = χh[β] the set of all herd
immunity provider strategies, i.e.
χh ={p ∈ C+([0, T ]) with p(0)=p(T ), and β(t)I1[p](t) < r, for all t ∈ [0, T ]} .
If there is no endemic solution, we define χh ={p∈C+([0, T ]) with p(0)=p(T )}.
Note that, from the definition, it is clear that any preventive strategy is
also herd immunity provider, i.e., χp ⊂ χh.
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Finally, we will define the Nash-equilibrium strategy as the strategy that
minimizes the joint risk for every individual, given the strategy of all other
individuals.
Definition 6. Let β ∈ C([0, T ]), β(0) = β(T ) be given. Let us consider a
population with strategy p ∈ C+([0, T ]), and a focal individual that uses vac-
cination strategy p∗ ∈ RM+. Let P and P∗ be the cumulative distributions,
associated to p and p∗, respectively. Assume that the focal individual is sus-
ceptible at time t = 0, and therefore the probability to be susceptible at a later
time t is given by e−
∫ t
0 dP∗−µt. The joint (disease and vaccination) risk during
one season (i.e, the probability that something bad — disease or reaction to
the vaccine — happens in one season, times the associated risks) is given by
ρ[p∗, p] = rd
∫ T
0
β(t)I[p](t)e−
∫ t
0 dP∗−µtdt+ rv
∫ T
0
(
1− e−
∫ t
0 dP∗−µt
)
dt
= −rd
∫ T
0
(r − β(t)I[p](t)) e−
∫ t
0 dP∗−µtdt+ rvT .
Given a strategy p, a rational individual will choose a strategy p∗ such that
for every strategy p′ ∈ RM+
ρ[p∗, p] ≤ ρ[p′, p] .
We say that pNash ∈ RM+ is a Nash strategy if for any sequence pn ∈
C+([0, T ]), such that pn → pNash and for every strategy p′ ∈ RM+,
lim sup (ρ[pNash, pn]− ρ[p′, pn]) ≤ 0.
If pNash is a function, the above definition simplifies to the assertion that
ρ[pNash, pNash] ≤ ρ[p′, pNash] for every strategy p′ ∈ RM+.
We finish the subsection stating the existence theorem for both optimal
and Nash-equilibrium strategies. In general terms, for β ∈ C([0, T ]), with
β(0) = β(T ), we prove that there is at least one optimal vaccination strategy
and at least one Nash vaccination strategy. These strategies may not be
functions, but measures. This implies that, after rewriting System (1) in
the form X ′ = Γ(t,X), the function Γ : R+ ×∆2 → R2 is a Charatheodory
function (i.e., measurable in the first variable and continuous in the second)
and therefore there is a (weakest) topology which guarantees existence of
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solutions of the differential equations and gives continuous dependence for
each initial data point. See (Aliprantis and Border, 1999; Heunis, 1984) for
further details. The proof of the existence theorem below will be postponed
to Appendix B.
Theorem 1. Assume β ∈ C([0, T ]), with β(0) = β(T ). Then, there is at
least one optimal vaccination strategy popt[β] and at least one Nash vaccina-
tion strategy pNash[β].
3.3 Vaccination strategies for regular transmission func-
tions
Despite the fact that we cannot guarantee a priori existence of optimal and
Nash strategies as functions, we will provide precise conditions for which popt
and/or pNash are functions. In particular, we derive explicit formulas for the
optimal and Nash strategies for sufficiently regular transmission functions
β, with some extra technical conditions. In the end, we discuss vaccination
strategies when β is discontinuous (in particular of bounded variation).
We start by finding an explicit formula for popt in some special cases.
Theorem 2. Consider system (1). Assume that
β′(t) ≥ −(µ+ α)β(t)
(
β(t)
γ + µ
− 1
)
. (4)
Then
popt(t) = (µ+ α)
(
β(t)
γ + µ
− 1
)
+
β′(t)
β(t)
(5)
is an optimal strategy.
Proof. First note that popt(t) ≥ 0 if and only if β(t) satisfies Equation (4)
for all t ≥ 0.
We divide the proof in several steps:
1st step: We start by using Lemma 4 to show that β(0)S[popt](0) = γ+µ.
Indeed, let p = popt and therefore
S0[popt](0) =
(µ+ α)
∫ T
0
e−
µ+α
γ+µ
∫ T
s β(τ)dτ−log
β(T )
β(s) ds
1− e−µ+αγ+µ
∫ T
0 β(τ)dτ
=
γ + µ
β(T )
×
∫ T
0
d
ds
e−
µ+α
γ+µ
∫ T
s β(τ)dτds
1− e−µ+αγ+µ
∫ T
0 β(τ)dτ
=
γ + µ
β(0)
.
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2nd step: Now, we show that for any t > 0, β(t)S0[popt](t) = γ+µ. Using
Equation (1a) with S(t) = S[p](t), I(t) = I[p](0) = 0 and p = popt, we find
(β(t)S(t))′
= β′(t)S(t) + β(t)S ′(t)
= β′(t)S(t) + β(t)(µ+ α)−
[
β(t)(µ+ α)
(
β(t)
γ + µ
− 1
)
+ β′(t)
]
S(t)
− β(t)(µ+ α)S(t)
= β(t)(µ+ α)
(
1− β(t)S(t)
γ + µ
)
.
We conclude that β(t)S(t) = γ+µ is the unique solution of the last equation
with the initial condition found in the first step.
3rd step: Let Pi be the cumulative distribution associated to pi, i = 1, 2.
We will prove now that if
∫ T
s
dP1 ≥
∫ T
s
dP2, s ∈ [0, T ) and
∫ T
0
dP1 >
∫ T
0
dP2,
then S0[p1](t) < S0[p2](t). For simplicity, we write Si = S0[pi], i = 1, 2. From
Lemma 4, it is clear that S1(0) < S2(0). Furthermore,
(S1 − S2)′ + p1(t)(S1 − S2) + (µ+ α)(S1 − S2) = −(p1 − p2)S2 ≤ 0 .
After rewriting the last equation, we find that
d
dt
[
e
∫ t
0 (p1+µ+α)(τ)dτ (S1 − S2)
]
= −e
∫ t
0 (p1+µ+α)(τ)dτ (p1 − p2)S2 ≤ 0,
and conclude that S1(t) < S2(t) for all t.
4th step: We now show that E[popt] = (µ+ α)(1− 〈S0[popt]〉). Indeed, let
pn be a sequence such that
∫ T
s
dPn >
∫ T
s
dPopt for any s ≥ 0, where Pn and
Popt are the cumulative distributions associated to pn and popt, respectively.
Assume, furthermore, that pn → popt as measure. We use Sn = S0[pn]:
therefore Sn(t) < S0[popt](t) =
γ+µ
β(t)
and then pn ∈ χp. Furthermore, 0 =
〈S ′n〉 = µ + α − E[pn] − (µ + α)〈Sn〉 and E[pn] = (µ + α)(1 − 〈S0[pn]〉). We
take n→∞ and use the continuity of S0 in pn. This finishes this step.
5th step: Finally, we prove that for any p ∈ χp, E[p] > E[popt]. From
S0[p](t) <
γ+µ
β(t)
= S0[popt](t), we conclude that 〈S0[p]〉 < 〈S0[popt]〉 and there-
fore E[p] > (µ+ α)(1− 〈S0[popt]〉) = E[popt].
Now, we show that for a non-constant seasonal epidemics, it is always
better to consider the natural fluctuations, also at the level of the vaccination
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campaign. This result goes along with Agur et al. (1993). See also the
discussion in Onyango and Mu¨ller (2014).
Corollary 1. Let β be a non-constant periodic function, and assume that
the optimal strategy popt[β] is given by Equation (5). Then, E [popt[β]] <
E [popt [〈β〉]].
Proof. We use the classical harmonic/arithmetic mean inequality, i.e.,
〈
1
β
〉−1
≤
〈β〉, with equality if and only if β is constant. Hence,
E [popt [β]] = (µ+ α) (1− 〈S0 [popt [β]]〉) = (µ+ α)
(
1−
〈
γ + µ
β
〉)
≤ (µ+ α)
(
1− γ + µ〈β〉
)
= (µ+ α) (1− S0 [popt [〈β〉]])
= E [popt [〈β〉]] ,
with equality if and only if β is constant.
Corollary 2. In the optimal vaccination case, the total number of vacci-
nations in a single season do not exceed the number of newborns plus the
number of individuals that lost their immunity during the previous season,
i.e, assuming the worst case scenario, where everyone got the disease or was
vaccinated, i.e., E[popt] < µ+ α.
Proof. Consider p0 the vaccination strategy defined in Lemma 5. Then
E[popt] ≤ E[p0] = 1
T
∫ T
0
p0(t)S0[p0](t)dt =
p0(µ+ α)
p0 + µ+ α
< µ+ α .
The preceding corollary shows that it is possible to prevent outbreaks
without vaccinating the entire population, which means that it is still possi-
ble to attain the herd immunity effect in this more restricted framework of
preventive strategies.
We finish this section by stating an explicit formula for pNash in some
special cases.
18
Theorem 3. Assume r < inft∈[0,T ] β(t),
β′(t)
β(t)
≤ γ + µ ≤ β
′(t)
β(t)
+ β(t) and (6)
d
dt
[
e(r+α−γ)t
d
dt
(
e(γ+µ)t
β(t)
)]
≤ e(r+µ+α)t
(
µ+ α− αr
β(t)
)
. (7)
Then, the strategy given by
pNash(t)
=
β2(t)
(γ + µ)β(t)−β′(t)
[
µ+α+(γ + µ)
β′(t)
β2(t)
− 2(β
′(t))2
β3(t)
+
β′′(t)
β2(t)
− αr
β(t)
]
−[r + µ+ α]
(8)
is a Nash-equilibrium strategy.
Proof. We show that pNash ≥ 0, S1(t), I1(t) ∈ [0, 1], ∀t and β(t)I1[pNash](t) =
r for all t ≥ 0. Initially, let us define
S1(t) =
γ + µ
β(t)
− β
′(t)
β2(t)
= e−(γ+µ)t
d
dt
(
e(γ+µ)t
β(t)
)
.
Note that Equation (6) guarantees that S1(t) ∈ [0, 1] for all t. Also, the
assumption on r implies that I(t) ∈ [0, 1] for all t. Furthermore,
pNash(t) =
µ+ α− S ′1(t)− αI1(t)
S1(t)
− (r + µ+ α) .
With this definition, note that
−β(t)S1I1 = S ′1 + pNashS1 − (µ+ α)(1− S1) + αI1 = −rS1
and therefore β(t)I1[pNash](t) = r > 0. Finally, we use Equation (7) to prove
that pNash ≥ 0. From Definition 6, we conclude that ρ[p∗, pNash] does not
depend on p∗ and therefore pNash is a Nash-equilibrium.
Note that the definition of S1 was motivated by plugging I(t) = r/β(t)
into Equation (1b); in particular, this choice of I(t) cancels the first term of
ρ on Definition 6.
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3.4 Comparisons
Now, we compare the vaccination effort associated with the two extreme
vaccination strategies.
Proposition 1. Assume that pNash 6∈ χp. Then, E[pNash] < E[popt].
Proof. We use that 0 = 〈βI1S1〉 − (γ + µ)〈I1〉 and 0 = (µ + α)(1 − 〈S1〉) −
E[pNash] − α〈I1〉 − 〈βI1S1〉 to conclude that E[pNash] = (µ + α)(1 − 〈S1〉) −
(α + µ + γ)〈I1〉 < (µ + α)(1 − 〈S1〉). Assume I1(t) 6= 0 for some t, and
consequently I1(t) 6= 0 for all t. Therefore
S1[pNash](t) =
γ + µ
β(t)
+
I ′1[pNash](t)
β(t)I1[pNash](t)
=
γ + µ
β(t)
+
I ′1[pNash](t)
r
,
and finally 〈S1[pNash]〉 = (γ + µ)〈β−1〉 = 〈S0[popt]〉 and E[popt] = (µ+ α)(1−
〈S0〉).
Corollary 3. Let pNash and popt be the Nash and optimal vaccination strate-
gies associated to a given transmission parameter β, respectively. Assume
further that conditions in Theorem 2 and 3 are satisfied. Then E[popt] −
E[pNash] = r(γ + µ+ α)〈β−1〉 > 0.
Proof. From Equation (1), we have E[popt] = 〈poptS0〉 = (µ + α)(1 − 〈S0〉),
where 〈S0〉 = (γ + µ)〈β−1〉. Furthermore,
E[pNash] = 〈pNashS1〉 = (µ+ α)(1− 〈S1〉)− 〈βI1S1〉 − α〈I1〉 .
We also have that
〈S1〉 =
〈(
I ′1
βI1
+
γ + µ
β
)〉
=
1
r
〈I ′1〉+ (γ + µ)〈β−1〉 = (γ + µ)〈β−1〉.
On the other hand, 〈βS1I1〉 = r(γ + µ)〈β−1〉. Furthermore, 〈I1〉 = r〈β−1〉.
Finally,
E[pNash] = (µ+ α)
(
1− (γ + µ)〈β−1〉)− r(γ + µ)〈β−1〉 − αr〈β−1〉
= E[popt]− r(γ + µ+ α)〈β−1〉 .
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In this work, instead of minimizing the vaccination effort in the set of
strategies with R0 below one, we minimized the vaccination effort in a subset
χp, which we have called the set of preventive strategies. Still, we can prove
the following result.
Proposition 2. R0[popt] ≤ 1.
Proof. The inequality follows immediately from the Definitions 3 and 4 and
Equation (2).
4 Examples
4.1 The constant case
Let us consider β(t) = β0, for all t.
If β0 ≤ γ + µ, we have that S0(t) = 1 for all t, and therefore {p0 :=
p(t) = 0,∀t} ∈ χp. As E[0] = 0, we conclude that popt(t) = 0. As there is no
endemic solution, we conclude that pNash(t) = 0.
Now, assume β0 > γ + µ and assume additionally that r > 0 is small.
From Theorem 2, popt = (µ + α)(S0[popt]
−1 − 1) = (µ + α)
(
β0
γ+µ
− 1
)
which
coincides with the optimal strategy in the traditional sense of R0[popt] = 1.
The first condition on Theorem 3 is trivially satisfied and the second one is
satisfied whenever
r ≤ r∗ := (µ+ α)(γ + µ)
γ + µ+ α
(
β0
γ + µ
− 1
)
.
In this case, I1[pNash] =
r
β0
6= 0, and therefore 0 = I1[pNash]′ =
I1[pNash](β0S1[pNash] − γ − µ) and therefore S1[pNash] = γ+µβ0 . Furthermore
0 = S1[pNash]
′(t) = µ+α−αI1[pNash]−β0I1[pNash]S1[pNash]− pNashS1[pNash]−
(µ+ α)S1[pNash]. Finally,
pNash = (µ+α)
(
β0
γ + µ
− 1
)
−r
(
1 +
α
γ + µ
)
= popt−r
(
1 +
α
γ + µ
)
< popt ,
i.e., the rational level of vaccination will not be able to eliminate the disease
as previously shown in (Bauch and Earn, 2004). It is clear that both popt
and pNash are admissible.
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4.2 The sinusoidal case
For the sinusoidal case, with β(t) = β0(1 + ε cos t) we can provide precise
results. First, note that the condition (4) in Theorem 2 is
−β0ε sin t ≥ −(µ+ α)β0(1 + ε cos t)
(
β0(1 + ε cos t)
γ + µ
− 1
)
,
or, equivalently
ε sin t ≤ (µ+ α)β0
γ + µ
(1 + ε cos t)2 − (µ+ α)(1 + ε cos t) .
If
ε ≤ (µ+ α)
(
β0
γ + µ
− 1
)
− ε(µ+ α)
(
2β0
γ + µ
− 1
)
,
condition (4) will be satisfied for every t. It follows that last equation is true
if
ε ≤ ε0 :=
(
2(µ+ α)β0
γ + µ
+ 1− µ− α
)−1
(µ+ α)
(
β0
γ + µ
− 1
)
.
Now, assume β(t) = β0(1 + ε cos t) with ε ≤ ε0. Note that
〈S0[popt]〉 = γ + µ
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dt
β(t)
=
γ + µ
2piβ0
∫ 2pi
0
dt
1 + ε cos t
=
γ + µ
β0
√
1− ε2 ,
showing that the vaccination effort for the optimal solution
E[popt] = (µ+ α)(1− 〈S0〉)
decreases with the oscillation amplitude. Furthermore,
popt(t)
= (µ+ α)
(
β0(1 + ε cos t)
γ + µ
− 1
)
− εβ0 sin t
β0(1 + ε cos t)
= (µ+ α)
(
β0
γ + µ
− 1
)
+ ε
(
(µ+ α)β0
γ + µ
cos t− sin t
)
+O (ε2)
= (µ+ α)
(
β0
γ + µ
− 1
)
+ ε
√
(µ+ α)2β20 + (µ+ γ)
2
(µ+ γ)
cos(t+ ϕ) +O (ε2) ,
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where ϕ = arctg γ+µ
β0(µ+α)
. It is clear that 〈β′
β
〉 = 0 and therefore 〈popt〉 is the
same as in the constant case. However, the vaccination effort 〈poptS0[popt]〉 =
(µ + α) (1− 〈S[popt]〉) = (µ + α)
(
1− γ+µ
β0
√
1−ε2
)
is strictly smaller than in
the constant case. Furthermore, to first order in ε, the optimal vaccination
strategy popt lags behind the transmission rate by a phase shift of ϕ. In
particular, if the birth/mortality rate is very high (and therefore there is
an extremely fast renewal of susceptible individuals), i.e., µ → ∞, then
ϕ→ arctg 1
β0
. This means that the optimal vaccination time shift will depend
on the average transmission rate. In the more realistic case µ→ 0, i.e, when
the renewal is low, then ϕ→ arctg γ
β0α
. This case is of much higher interest
in practice as it models the case when the disease time scales (contact rate,
recovery time, temporary immunity) are much smaller than the typical time
scale of one generation of the population. Assuming γ
β0α
≈ 1 (i.e., immunity
lasts for approximately R0 ≈ α−1 years), then ϕ ≈ pi4 , i.e., in a seasonal
epidemic, the peak of the vaccination rate, p, should be approximately 1.5
months before the transmission peak. Note that this is not the peak of the
instantaneous number of vaccinations, pS, as illustrated in Figure 3.
Now, we use Theorem 3 to obtain the Nash strategy. Condition (6) can
be rewritten
−ε sin t+O (ε2) = − ε sin t
1 + ε cos t
≤ γ + µ ≤ β0 + ε(β0 cos t− sin t) +O
(
ε2
)
= β0+ε
√
β20 + 1 cos(t+ ϕ˜)+O
(
ε2
)
,
for a certain ϕ˜. This is true if, for example, ε ≤ γ + µ ≤ β0 − ε
√
β20 + 1, in
particular if β0 > γ + µ, and ε is small enough.
Equation (7) is equivalent to the non-negativeness of pNash, given by Equa-
tion (8). Let us assume that the relative risk of the vaccination is low, i.e.,
r = O(ε). After some extensive, but straightforward calculations, we con-
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clude that
pNash[β](t)
=(µ+ α)
(
β0
γ + µ
− 1
)
− r
(
α
γ + µ
+ 1
)
+ ε
β0
γ + µ
√
(γ + µ)2 + 1
(
µ+ α
γ + µ
cos(t+ ψ)− 1
β0
sin(t+ ψ)
)
=(µ+ α)
(
β0
γ + µ
− 1
)
− r
(
α
γ + µ
+ 1
)
+ ε
1
(γ + µ)2
√
(γ + µ)2 + 1
√
β20(µ+ α)
2 + (γ + µ)2 cos(t+ ϕ+ ψ) ,
where tanψ = 1
γ+µ
and tanϕ = γ+µ
β0(µ+α)
. It is clear that if β0
γ+µ
> 1, then, for
ε, r small enough, the Nash-equilibrium is given by pNash > 0 as obtained in
the previous equation. It is also clear that both popt and pNash are admissible
at leading order.
If µ → 0, β0α/γ = O(1), then ϕ ≈ pi4 ; this means that pNash will peak
shortly before popt; however amplitude oscillations are slightly larger for pNash.
Finally, the difference between both vaccination efforts are given by
E[popt]− E[pNash] = r(γ + µ+ α)
2piβ0
∫ 2pi
0
dt
1 + ε cos t
=
r(γ + µ+ α)
β0
√
1− ε2 .
Figure 3 shows the peaks and oscillations of the optimal and Nash strategies,
for the sinusoidal case, and how the difference between them depends on the
vaccination risk.
In Figure 4, we consider three different vaccination profiles for sinusoidal
transmission: optimal vaccination, p(t) = popt[β]; optimal vaccination in the
case of average transmission rate, p = popt[〈β〉]; and optimal vaccination in
the case of maximum transmission, p = popt[β¯] (used in Lemma 5). This
example also illustrates the result of Corollary 1, namely, it shows that,
for a given sinusoidal transmission rate β, the effort associated to popt[〈β〉]
is larger than the effort associated to popt[β]. However, popt[〈β〉] does not
prevent initial outbreaks. Additionally, we show that popt[β¯] prevents the
initial outbreak but with a higher associated effort.
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Figure 3: Optimal and Nash strategies for the sinusoidal transmission with
low and high vaccination risk, r. We use µ = (80T )−1, γ = 52/T , α = 2/T ,
with T = 2pi and consider β(t) = 26(1 + 0.3 cos(t)), implying γ
β0α
= 1 and
R0 = 〈β〉γ = pi ≈ 3. Left: Both popt (blue, continuous) and pNash (red, dashed)
oscillate in a synchronous way. The peak popt is pi/4 before the peak of the
transmission rate; the peak of pNash is slightly before. Right: Time dependent
vaccination effort, in the two cases. Above: small vaccination risk, r = 0.005;
pNash is higher than popt in the beginning of the epidemic season and lower
otherwise. Below: high vaccination risk, r = 0.1; popt > pNash for all t,
but the difference is larger when β is decreasing. For simplicity, we plot in
all cases β(t) in gray dotted line (out of scale). The choice of parameters
is inspired by influenza like epidemiological parameters: life expectancy of
80 years, recovery time of 1 week, and temporary immunity of 6 months,
and R0 ≈ 3 (cf. (Goeyvaerts et al., 2015)). In the absence of vaccination,
there is only one stable attractor of the solution (S(t), I(t)) with period T
(cf. (Kuznetsov and Piccardi, 1994)).
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Figure 4: Prevention of initial outbreaks for different vaccination profiles.
We consider all parameters, including the transmission rate, as in Figure 3
and assume initial conditions given by S0[p](0)−0.01 and I(0) = 0.01, where
S0[p](0) is given by Lemma 4. We consider three different vaccination profiles:
p = popt[β] (blue, continuous), p = popt[〈β〉] (red, dashed) and p = popt[β¯]
(green, dash-dot). Note that the optimal strategy in the case of the average
transmission rate is unable to prevent initial outbreaks (however, I(t) → 0
when t → ∞). Vaccination efforts E[popt[β¯]] = 0.1165 > E[popt[〈β〉] =
0.1098 > E[popt[β]] = 0.1090, respectively.
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4.3 A critical case
Condition (4) in Theorem 2, provides a lower bound on the derivative of
the transmission coefficient β. In particular, if β is increasing, Theorem 2
provides (at least, in principle) one optimal strategy. However, to apply
Theorem 2, it is important that β does not decrease instantaneously. In this
section, we will study a critical example for optimal vaccinations, where β
satisfies the critical condition β′ = −(µ+α)β
(
β
γ+µ
− 1
)
in (0, 2pi) and is not
differentiable at t = 0. As usual, β is periodic in R. Explicitly, we consider
β(t) =
γ + µ
1−K exp(−(µ+ α)t)) , t ∈ [0, 2pi) , (9)
where K ∈ (0, 1) is a constant.
We consider a mollification of β, βε, such that βε is differentiable, satisfies
the condition (4), and βε → β when ε → 0 pointwise. Let pε := popt[βε]. It
is clear that pε(t)→ 0 for t 6= 0, and∫ 2pi
0
pεdt→ (µ+ α)2pi
(
1
γ + µ
〈β〉 − 1
)
= 2pi(µ+ α)
(
1
2pi(µ+ α)
log
e2(µ+α)pi−K
1−K − 1
)
= log
e2(µ+α)pi−K
1−K − 2pi(µ+ α) = log
e2(µ+α)pi −K
1−K + log e
−2pi(µ+α)
= log
1−Ke−2(µ+α)pi
1−K =: Γ.
Thus pε → Γ
∑
i∈Z δ2pii := popt. From Equation (5), it is clear that for t ∈
(0, 2pi), popt[lim βε](t) = lim popt[βε](t), and therefore popt[lim βε] = lim popt[βε]
as measures. This shows that discontinuities in β will be associated to peak
vaccinations. From Lemma 4, we have that
S[popt](0) =
(µ+ α)
∫ T
0
e−(µ+α)(T−s)−
Γ
2
−Γ
2
θ(−s)ds
1− e−Γ−(µ+α)T =
e−Γ/2(1− e−(µ+α)T )
1− e−Γ−(µ+α)T ,
where θ(s) = 0 for s ≤ 0 and θ(s) = 1 for s > 0 is the Heaviside function.
Furthermore∫
S[pε](t)pε(t)dt→ Γe−Γ/2 1− e
−(µ+α)T
1− e−Γ−(µ+α)T ≤ (µ+ α)T ,
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Figure 5: Optimal strategy for the critical case, with relaxed β(t) Left: Re-
laxed version of β(t) given by Equation (9) with K = 0.862, and the other
parameters as in Figure 1, with T = 2pi. We consider a sequence βε of differ-
entiable functions, such that βε(t) = β(t) for t ∈ (ε, 2pi − ε) and the points
2pi − ε and 2pi + ε ≡ ε are connected by a third order polynomial. Right: a
sequence of pε := popt[βε]; note that (pε)ε>0 resembles a delta-sequence.
where we used that
xe−x/2
1− e−y
1− e−x−y = x
sinh y
2
sinh x+y
2
≤ y , ∀x, y > 0 .
This last inequality follows from the convexity of the function
sinhα = sinh
(
β
α + β
0 +
α
α + β
(α + β)
)
≤ β
α + β
sinh 0+
α
α + β
sinh (α + β) ,
and therefore, for α, β > 0,
sinhα
sinh(α + β)
≤ α
α + β
≤ α
β
.
Optimal strategy for the critical case, using a relaxed version of the trans-
mission function β(t), is illustrated in Figure 5.
5 Discussion
In this work, we consider a SIRS model with periodic transmission, where
we introduce periodic vaccination of adults. We are naturally led to consider
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temporary immunity, as discussed in (Onyango and Mu¨ller, 2014): in the
case of diseases with life-long immunity and lifespan much longer than the
period (µ ∼ α  1/T ) the vaccination is not affected by periodicity. For
instance, measles has periodic transmission rate but, since it confers perma-
nent immunity, periodic vaccination is not used. In this work we implicitly
assume µ 1/T ≈ α.
We study the consequences of two extreme types of vaccination strategies:
mandatory vaccination, where a certain predefined fraction of the population
is vaccinated; and voluntary vaccination, where individuals can choose freely
to be vaccinated or not, according to their risk perception. Classically, the
objective is to minimize the vaccination effort while reducing the effective
reproductive number below one, which guaranties long term disease elimi-
nation. Here, we choose to work with an alternative definition of optimal
vaccination. We define a class of preventive vaccination strategies as vac-
cination profiles that, for any sufficiently small perturbation of the disease
free state, the number of infectious individuals is monotonically decreasing,
avoiding the occurrence of any epidemic event. This approach allows, for
specific regular transmission functions β(t), the derivation of an analytical
expression of the optimal strategy. In general, we prove the existence of an
optimal strategy, in a suitably defined closure of the space of all preventive
strategies, which minimizes the vaccination effort.
In this work, we extend the classical results by Bauch and Earn (2004)
to periodic functions, based on a series of recent results on periodic diseases.
We model human behaviour using classical economical theory, where indi-
viduals are assumed to be rational and fully informed. We define the set
of vaccination strategies that provide herd immunity, for which the rational
strategy of a given focal individual is not to be vaccinated. Finally, we prove
the existence of a Nash vaccination strategy as the strategy that minimizes
the joint risk for every individual, taking into account the strategy of all
other individuals.
In general, both optimal and Nash strategies will not be functions but
Radon measures. For specific forms of the transmission rate, we provide
explicit formulas, which includes some important examples as constant or
sinusoidal transmission functions.
There are several natural limitations of the work presented here. One first
limitation is that we consider only the stationary solution of the System (1),
but we never discuss the approach to this equilibrium. This is an important
question, both in the study of ordinary differential equations (i.e., the study
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of the basin of attraction) and in evolutionary game theory, where the study
of ω-limits of conveniently defined dynamical equations is preferred to the
static study of Nash-equilibria. In the non-stationary case, a rational decision
will require the ability to forecast the evolution of the epidemic, i.e., rational
decisions will depend on future decisions of the entire population and not
only on the past decisions. This is mathematically described by the so called
“mean field game theory” (Lasry and Lions, 2007) and will be object of a
future work.
Closely related ideas will also help us to solve one of the major gaps of
the current work: the lack of a numerical method for finding Nash-equilibria
solution when Theorem 3 fails. More precisely, the idea will be to develop a
numerical method that allows constant update in individual decisions and,
consequently, also at the population level. As discussed before, this will
require, at the individual level, a certain expectation on the future evolution
of the disease.
It is also important, and will be subject of a future work, to design a
precise scheme, possibly numerical, that allows to go beyond Theorem 2.
This will require the use of Optimal Control Theory. In fact, given p, it is
possible to explicitly obtain the disease free solution S[p](t) (see Lemma 4)
and therefore we need to minimize
∫ T
0
p(t)S[p](t)dt in χp[β]. (Equivalently,
we may maximize
∫ T
0
S[p](t)dt in the same set, as 〈pS0〉 = (µ+α) (1− 〈S0〉).)
We also plan to compare popt with the optimal solution in the approach in
which the vaccination effort is minimized in the class of vaccination functions
p such that R0 ≤ 1.
Furthermore, despite the simplicity of the periodic SIRS system (even
with vaccination), solutions can be extremely complicated; even chaotic so-
lutions may be present in such simple systems, cf. (Kuznetsov and Piccardi,
1994). The coupling of the differential equations with human rational be-
haviour presented in this work only started the exploration of all this math-
ematical richness.
A Proof of Lemma 1
We follow closely the proof at (Rebelo et al., 2012), where x1 = I, x2 = S
and x3 = R. Also, m = 1 indicates that there is only one infectious class
and n = 3 denotes the three possible classes in the model. We readily verify
that conditions (A1) − (A5) in (Rebelo et al., 2012) are satisfied. Unique-
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ness and stability (in the disease free subspace) of the disease free solution
(S0(t), 0, R0(t)) is guaranteed by standard theorems. The linearisation of sys-
tem (1) restricted to I = 0 around the disease-free solution (S0(t), 0, R0(t))
is given by {
s′ = −µs− p(t)s+ αr
r′ = −µr + p(t)s− αr
that can be explicitly solved to get{
s(t) = s(0)a(t) + (s(0) + r(0))b(t)
r(t) = (s(0) + r(0))e−µt − s(t)
where a(t) = e−
∫ t
0 µ+α+p(τ) dτ and b(t) =
∫ t
0
αe−µτ−
∫ t
τ (µ+α+p(l)) dl dτ . This
yields that the monodromy matrix M(t) of the linearised system is
M(T ) =
[
a(T ) + b(T ) b(T )
e−µT − a(T )− b(T ) e−µT − b(T )
]
.
We compute the Floquet multipliers ρ1 = a(T ) < 1 and ρ2 = e
−µT < 1 and
conclude condition (A6). We verify immediately that conditions (A7) and
(A8) are also satisfied.
Let (S, I, R) be a solution of the system (1) and (S0, 0, R0) the disease
free solution of the same system. Therefore
(S−S0)′ = −αI−βIS−(p(t)+µ+α)(S−S0) ≤ −(p(t)+µ+α)(S−S0). (10)
This yields for every t ≥ 0. Consequently, by Gronwall’s lemma
S(t)− S0(t) ≤ (S(t0)− S0(t0)) exp
(
−
∫ t
t0
(p(s) + µ+ α) ds
)
for any t ≥ t0 ≥ 0.
So, for any  > 0 there is t1() ≥ 0 such that for any t > t1 we have
S(t)− S0(t) < . (11)
Now, assume that there is t0 ≥ 0 such that I(t) ≤  for every t ≥ t0.
Therefore, as S < 1,
(S0−S)′ = αI+βIS−(p(t)+µ+α)(S0−S) ≤ (β+α)−(p(t)+µ+α)(S0−S),
(12)
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and, by Rebelo et al. (2012, lemma 1) there exists k > 0, independent of ,
and t2() ≥ t0 such that for all t ≥ t2
S0(t)− S(t) ≤ k. (13)
For any solution in the disease-free subspace (i.e., with I(t) = 0 for all
t ≥ 0), we have the validity of Conditions (10) and (12), and, therefore, we
conclude that the disease free solution is globally asymptotically stable.
Now, we show the alternative in Lemma 1. Let R0 = 〈βS0〉γ+µ , as defined
in Onyango and Mu¨ller (2014) and in a more general setting in Rebelo et al.
(2012); Wang and Zhao (2008). We show that the only relevant assumption
in Rebelo et al. (2012, theorem 2) is the value of R0. In particular, we define
the 1×1 matrices F (t) = [β(t)S0(t)] and V (t) = [µ+γ] (Rebelo et al., 2012).
By (11), for every  > 0 there is t1 > 0 such that for t ≥ t1,
I ′(t) = β(t)I(t)S(t)− (γ + µ)I(t) ≤ β(t)I(t)(+ S0(t))− (γ + µ)I(t)
≤
(
F (t)
λ1()
− V (t)
)
I(t)
where λ1() = mint
S0(t)
+S0(t)
. Notice that λ1() > 0 and that λ1() → 1 from
below when → 0.
If R0 < 1, Rebelo et al. (2012, theorem 2, condition 1) guarantees that
the diseases dies out, I(t) → 0 as t → ∞ and that (S0, 0, R0) is globally
asymptotically stable.
Now, assume R0 > 1; from 1T
∫ T
0
β(t)S0(t) dt − (µ + γ) > 0 and by
continuity in t, we have that F (t)− V (t) is irreducible for some t ∈ [0, T ).
For any  > 0, if there is t0 ≥ 0 such that I(t) ≤  for every t ≥ t0 then,
by (13), there is t2 ≥ t0 such that, for t ≥ t2,
I ′(t) ≥ β(t)I(t)(S0(t)− k)− (µ+ γ)I(t) ≥
(
F (t)
λ2()
− V (t)
)
I(t),
where λ2() = maxt
S0(t)
S0(t)−k satisfies lim→0+ λ2() = 1 and λ2 : (0, 
∗) → R+
if we choose ∗ ≤ 1
k
mint S0(t) (observe that Lemma 4 and its proof guarantees
that mint S0(t) > 0).
We conclude that the conditions in Rebelo et al. (2012, theorem 2, state-
ment 2) are satisfied and there is uniform persistence of system (1) with
respect to I.
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Finally, we prove the existence of a persistent periodic solution. We define
the T -mapping P : ∆2 → ∆2 by P (x0) = x(T, (x0, 0)), where x(·, (x0, 0)) is
the solution of System 1 with initial conditions x(0) = x0 ∈ ∆2 := {(S, I) ∈
R2+, S + I ≤ 1}, the two-dimensional simplex. P is a continuous map such
that P (M0) ⊂ M0 for M0 = {(I, S) ∈ ∆2 : I 6= 0}. Observe that M0 is
an open set of ∆2 with the topology induced in ∆2. As we have uniform
persistence of system (1) with respect to I we also have uniform persistence
of P with respect to M0 as described in Zhao (1995) (for a more general
case see (Magal and Zhao, 2005)). Applying (Zhao, 1995, theorem 2.1) we
conclude that P : M0 → M0 admits a global attractor and there is a fixed
point for P in that attractor, which is a T -periodic solution of (1) (see, for
example, lemma 4.4 in Verhulst (1996)).
B Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. First we recall that RM+ is compact with the weak topology, cf. (Ko-
ralov and Sinai, 2007). We have that C([0, T ]) ⊂ RM+ in the sense that
for each continuous function we consider the correspondent cumulative dis-
tribution function. Consequently the closure C([0, T ]) ⊂ RM+ is compact.
The map E : C([0, T ]) → [0,+∞] defined in Definition 1 and extended in
Lemma 3 is continuous with respect to the weak topology.
Existence of popt: As χp ⊂ RM+ is compact, from the continuity of E,
we conclude that there is a measure popt ∈ χp such that for all p ∈ χp,
E[p] ≥ E[popt].
Existence of pNash: Let us consider fixed time intervals ∆t, such that
T/(∆t) = N ∈ N, and consider periodic continuous piecewise affine func-
tions in intervals (i∆t, (i+1)∆t), i ∈ {0, . . . , N−1} (i.e, functions, such that
f(t) = f(bt/∆tc∆t) + f((bt/∆tc+1)∆t)−f(bt/∆tc∆t)
∆t
(t − bt/∆tc∆t); furthermore,
f(N∆t) = f(0)). These functions can be represented by vectors in RN+ . Let
v ∈ Υ := {v ∈ RN+ |0 ≤ v1 ≤ v2 ≤ · · · ≤ vN ≤ (α + µ)N β¯γ+µ}. The set Υ is
convex and compact. Now for each vector v ∈ Υ consider the distributions
pv : [0, T ]→ R+, such that the associated cummulative distribution is given
by Pv(t) = vi +
vi+1−vi
∆t
(t − i∆t) for t ∈ [i∆t, (i + 1)∆t], i ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}.
Consider I[pv] and S[pv] solutions of System (1), and define for v,v
∗ ∈ Υ
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the joint risk (except for some immaterial constants)
ρ∆t[v∗,v] = −
N∑
i=1
{
(r − β(i∆t)I[pv](i∆t)) e−v∗i
}
.
It is clear that v∗i ≈
∫ i∆t
0
dP∗ = P∗([0, i∆t]). We define a function F :
Υ→ 2Υ such that v˜ ∈ F [v] if and only if ρ∆t[v˜,v] ≤ ρ∆t[v′,v] for all v′ ∈ Υ.
It is clear that F [v] 6= ∅, as Υ is compact and ρ∆t[·,v] is continuous.
Now, we prove that F [v] is closed and convex. The first property follows
again from the continuity of ρ∆t[·,v]. Define rˆi = r − β(i∆t)I[pv](i∆t). We
divide the last property in two cases:
1. Assume that rˆi ≤ 0 for all i and let v∗ be such that ρ[v∗,v] ≤ ρ[v′,v]
for all v′ ∈ Υ. Assume in addition that there is v˜ such that ρ[v∗,v] =
ρ[v˜,v] for all v ∈ Υ. Therefore, for α ∈ (0, 1),
ρ∆t[αv∗ + (1− α)v˜,v] = −
∑
i
rˆie
−αv∗i−(1−α)v˜i
≤ −
∑
i
rˆi
(
αe−v
∗
i + (1− α)e−v˜i)
= αρ∆t[v∗,v] + (1− α)ρ∆t[v˜,v] = ρ[v∗,v]
≤ ρ∆t[αv∗ + (1− α)v˜,v] ;
hence v∗, v˜ ∈ F [v] implies that αv∗ + (1− α)v˜ ∈ F .
2. Let I := {i|rˆi > 0} 6= ∅. In order to minimize ρ∆t[·,v], we impose to
each i ∈ I the minimum possible value, i.e., v∗i = v∗i−1. Therefore, we
shall minimize
ρ∆tI [v
∗,v] := −
∑
i 6∈I
{
(r − β(i∆t)I[pv](i∆t)) e−v∗i
}
.
The existence of a minimum is guaranteed by the compacity of ΥI :=
{v ∈ RN+ |0 ≤ v1 ≤ v2 ≤ · · · ≤ vN ≤ (α + µ)N β¯γ+µ , i ∈ I ⇒ vi−1 = vi}.
Then, we repeat the previous analysis and conclude that F [v] is closed
and convex.
We conclude that the set of best replies is non-empty, convex, closed
and due to the continuity of I in p (see Lemma 1) and of ρ∆t in v and v∗,
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the graph is closed. Therefore from standard applications of Kakutani fixed
point theorem, there is a fixed point vector of the function F , v(∆t), such
that its affine function continuation p(∆t) is a Nash-equilibrium restricted to
affine functions with steps ∆t. See, e.g., (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1995).
Furthermore
P(∆t)([0, T ]) =
N−1∑
i=0
p(∆t)(i∆t)∆t ≤
N−1∑
i=0
vi∆t ≤ (α+µ)N β¯
γ + µ
∆t = (α+µ)T
β¯
γ + µ
.
From the compactness of C([0, T ]), there is a measure p ∈ C([0, T ]) such that
lim∆t→0 p(∆t) = p (possibly after taking subsequences), where the convergence
is in the weak topology.
The last step is to prove that p is indeed a Nash-equilibrium in C([0, T ]).
Assume it is not; then, there is p˜ in C([0, T ]) such that ρ[p˜, p] < ρ[p, p].
From the continuity of ρ, there is a (∆t)0 > 0, small enough, such that all
restricted Nash-equilibria found above are such that ρ[p˜, p(∆t)] < ρ[p(∆t), p(∆t)]
for ∆t < (∆t)0. Let p¯n be a sequence of continuous functions in C([0, T ])
such that pn → p˜ weakly, and therefore ρ[p¯n, p(∆t)] < ρ[p(∆t), p(∆t)], for a
certain value of ∆t and n large enough. Using the fact that ρ∆t[v∗,v] is the
trapezoidal approximation of ρ[p∗, p] (and therefore differs in O((∆t)2)) and
taking ∆t possibly even smaller, we conclude that p(∆t) is not a restricted
Nash-equilibrium, contradiction.
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